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A4: Evading Learning-based Adblockers
Abstract
Efforts by online ad publishers to circumvent traditional
ad blockers towards regaining fiduciary benefits, have been
demonstrably successful. As a result, there have recently
emerged a set of adblockers that apply machine learning in-
stead of manually curated rules and have been shown to be
more robust in blocking ads on websites including many
social media sites such as Facebook (AdblockPlus 2020).
Among these, AdGraph (Iqbal et al. 2020) which uses rich
contextual information to perform classifications, is arguably,
the state of the art learning-based adblocker. In this paper, we
develop A4, a tool that intelligently crafts adversarial sam-
ples of ads to evade AdGraph. Unlike the popular research
on adversarial samples against images or videos that are con-
sidered less- to un-restricted, the samples that A4 generates
preserve application semantics of the web page, or are ac-
tionable. Through several experiments we show that A4 can
bypass AdGraph about 60% of the time, which surpasses the
state-of-the-art attack by a significant margin of 84.3%; in
addition, changes to the visual layout of the web page due to
these perturbations are imperceptible. We envision the algo-
rithmic framework proposed in A4 is also promising in im-
proving adversarial attacks against other learning-based web
applications with similar requirements.
1 Introduction
As adblockers have gained popularity in recent years (Page-
Fair 2017), ad publishers have started fighting back towards
recovering their revenues. Specifically, many techniques
have emerged towards circumventing the current generation
of adblockers (Zhu et al. 2018). Notably, prior work (Zhu
et al. 2018) has shown that from among Alexa’s top 10K
websites, including many social media sites, more than 30%
have client-side JavaScript code that serve as countermea-
sures against adblocker use.
Conventionally, adblockers rely on manually curated
(and maintained) blacklists, with rules/signatures that are
matched against resource request URLs sent from the
browser and the elements rendered in a web page. Unfor-
tunately, maintaining such blacklists does not scale and is
error-prone. Furthermore, they are also fairly easy to subvert
(just as antivirus signatures) (Mughees, Qian, and Shafiq
2017; Iqbal, Shafiq, and Qian 2017). Given these limita-
tions, there has been a recent trend towards the emergence
of machine-learning-based adblockers (Iqbal et al. 2020;
Storey et al. 2017; Tigas et al. 2019) towards improving the
effectiveness and accuracy over signature-based adblockers.
Such adblockers can be categorized into “perceptual” and
“non-perceptual” classes.
Perceptual adblockers (Storey et al. 2017; Tigas et al.
2019) block ads by recognizing visual cues (e.g. ”spon-
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sored” or other marketing keywords) in the web page. It
is claimed that these are more robust because some regula-
tors (e.g. FTC) require publishers to disclose the “ad nature”
of their online content. However, recent research has shown
that these vision-based adblockers can be easily fooled by
adversarial examples; this is an artifact of the recent ad-
vances in adversarial machine learning (AML) (Trame`r et
al. 2018). In brief, by only adding human-imperceptible per-
turbation pixels to the ad images, a classifier can be fooled.
In contrast, non-perceptual adblockers detect ads based
on non-visual features such as the URL contents and page
structure. The state-of-the-art of non-perceptual ML-based
adblocker, arguably, is AdGraph (Iqbal et al. 2020) 1. Unlike
most previous works that rely on URL text or code struc-
ture alone, AdGraph builds a page loading graph for a web
page with rich contextual information, and extracts features
from it to classify HTTP(S) request nodes. The claim is that
AdGraph’s use of fine-grained structural/contextual infor-
mation provides improved robustness over other adblock-
ers, since it requires significant changes to a web page to
convincingly alter the structure towards concealing the ad.
Furthermore, the use of non-visual features inhibit the ap-
plicability of adversarial attack techniques from the uncon-
strained domain (i.e., image) (Trame`r et al. 2018). In a nut-
shell, a major contribution in this paper is that we show nei-
ther of these conclusions holds true with AML.
While there has been success on applying adversarial ex-
amples in unconstrained domains (e.g., images) (Carlini and
Wagner 2017), the feasibility of crafting such inputs in do-
mains with more stringent constraints (e.g., web pages) re-
mains largely unexplored. In the constrained web domain,
the visual perceptibility is altered if the semantics of the
web page are changed. Specifically, web pages are pro-
cessed by browsers prior to user exposition (unlike images).
Thus, rather than the magnitude of the perturbation being the
most important criterion, what matters is that the rendered
web page after applying the perturbation presents the same
look-and-feel and functionality to the user. This requirement
forces the perturbations to be what we call actionable and
requires a rethinking of what constraints must be enforced
while crafting adversarial samples.
Extending this principle to (ML based) adblockers, given
the goal of perturbing an ad resource request to bypass the
ML detection model: (i) the adversarial example should be
actionable in that it must be “mapped back” to the appro-
priate valid web page and (ii) the modified request must
preserve its original functionality of directing the requester
1(Sjosten et al. 2019) is a concurrent effort on extending Ad-
Graph to automatically generate filter lists but its classification
pipeline code has not been released. Because of this our work tar-
gets only AdGraph; however, we anticipate that one can draw sim-
ilar conclusions given the similarity in its design to AdGraph.
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to the remote ad server i.e., this requires the “functional”
parts of the page to be equivalent before and after modifica-
tion; only the other “non-functional” parts can be perturbed
to fool the classifier. Our goal in this paper is to develop a
tool (we call this A4) to automatically craft such actionable
perturbations that can subvert AdGraph. Towards achieving
this, our challenge is to realize the two properties below.
Feature-space actionability: First, any perturbation that
is generated in the feature-space must be bounded by
domain-specific constraints. Such constraints can be ex-
pressed explicitly by a set of mathematical formulas that the
perturbed feature vector must comply with, so as to preserve
the functionality of the original web resource and the valid-
ity of the page. Since these constraints are typically man-
ually identified (depending on the functionality to be pre-
served), the attacker needs to find a way to integrate them
properly into the adversarial example generation algorithm.
Application-space actionability: Second, upon mapping
the feature-space perturbations back to the raw input space
(web page), the computed modifications may cause un-
desired changes either because they violate some struc-
tural constraints (e.g., the number of nodes in a DOM tree
cannot be negative) or the violation of complicated inter-
relationships between objects in the page, that are projected
to the extracted feature values. Correcting these changes will
require adding offsets to the adversarial perturbations from
the feature-space. However, blindly applying them may ren-
der them non-adversarial, i.e., the attacker must account for
these offsets when generating perturbations.
As our primary contribution, we design A4- Actionable
Ad Adversarial Attack to generate perturbations that are ac-
tionable both in the feature-space and the application-space.
A4 only requires minimal domain knowledge towards pro-
viding a set of seed features that can be mapped from feature
space back to the input or application space. Specifically, it
has the following desirable characteristics.
• Efficient crafting: Inspired by the popular gradient-
based attack, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), A4 iteratively ac-
counts for the unique constraints of the web environment,
to generate potent adversarial samples. Our evaluations
show that A4 achieves a success rate of about 60% i.e.,
it subverts 60% of the inputs that were originally clas-
sified as ad/tracker by AdGraph, to benign. In compari-
son, a baseline attack that only accounts for actionability
requirements for one iteration (non-iteratively) can only
achieve a success rate of less than 33%, while a weaker
baseline cannot generate any viable example.
• Actionability: All perturbed web resources are guar-
anteed to comply with both the feature-space and
application-space constraints. Such compliance makes
these examples practical in that they still carry out their
ad/tracker functionalities.
• Stealthiness: A4 generates perturbations that have low
detectability. In our setup, generated perturbations are
bounded and concealed with respect to the correspond-
ing web pages, which make them hard to be detected by
adblockers; furthermore, they are invisible/imperceptible
to users (except for displaying the ads).
2 Background and Related work
In this section, we provide brief background on adblockers
and AML. We also discuss relevant related work.
Non-perceptual ML-based Adblocking. Because rule-
based adblockers are plagued by scale/errors and demon-
strable attacks, machine learning (ML)-based adblockers are
emerging. Instead of relying on hard-coded blacklists that
are manually curated and maintained, they use ML to infer
the intrinsic patterns of ad/tracker resources from different
representations of web pages. Previously, URL strings and
JavaScript code have been used as features to represent web
resources in ML models (Bhagavatula et al. 2014). How-
ever, these attempts have low accuracy because the repre-
sentations used are incomplete in capturing the distinguish-
ing characteristics of ad and non-ad resources. This led to
AdGraph (Iqbal et al. 2020), a more recent work on identi-
fying ad resources using ML; (arguably) because this is the
state-of-the-art in this field, we consider this as our target in
this paper.
AdGraph. By instrumenting the browser core, AdGraph
collects a comprehensive set of browser-internal events to
stitch together a graph that represents the interactions among
the HTML page elements, network requests, and JavaScript
executions (e.g., a web element is dynamically created by
a script). This representation is then used to train a classi-
fier for identifying advertising and tracking resources. With
support from this rich loading context, AdGraph extracts
65 features from a resource load, and classifies the request
based on these features. These features can be categorized
into two types: structural and content-based. Content-based
features include (but not limited to) certain susceptible ad-
related keywords in the URL and the requested resource type
(e.g. image, iframe). AdGraph’s classifier uses Random For-
est as the underlying model, which is non-differentiable. As
discussed later in §3, this choice hinders traditional AML
based attacks as they require gradient information to guide
the adversarial example generation. Moreover, from the 65
features AdGraph uses, 5 of them are categorical i.e., will be
converted into more than 250 sparse one-hot-encoded fea-
tures. Such sparsity not only poses new challenges for ex-
isting adversarial attacks that expect dense data, but require
additional constraints to ensure the validity of the one-hot
vectors (we discuss how A4 overcomes these in §3).
Adversarial attacks on ML models. The common setup
for adversarial attacks against binary ML classifiers is that
given a model and an input that is classified as malicious, an
attacker needs to modify the input to flip the model’s classi-
fication result. Formally, suppose a classifier defined by its
prediction function Pmodel and an input x with its malicious
label lmal; an attacker needs to find an adversarial transfor-
mation Tadv such that Pmodel(Tadv(xinput)) 6= lmal. The
AML community defines different levels of model trans-
parency to describe the knowledge that an attacker possesses
with regards to the target classifier:
• With White-box attacks, an attacker is assumed to know
all the information about the model, including but not lim-
ited to the model internals (e.g., the classifier model type,
parameters), the training dataset and feature definitions.
• With Grey-box attacks, the attackers do not know the in-
ternals of the model, but know the training dataset and
feature definitions. Further, the attacker can query the tar-
get classifier about the label for a specific input.
Gradient-based attacks. One popular attack is based on
the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Bruna et al. 2013),
which leverages the gradients derived from the target classi-
fier to compute the perturbation that maximizes its loss func-
tion with respect to the particular malicious input. Given
the loss function of the target model Lmodel, FGSM com-
putes its perturbation η as η =  ∗ sign(∇xLmodel), where
 is the norm constraint specified by the attacker. There are
also other variants (Dong et al. 2018) that follow the ”loss-
maximizing” philosophy used in FGSM. They are gener-
ally referred to as gradient-based attacks. Since these attacks
all use the gradient information from the target model, they
should be considered as white-box attacks.
Gradient-based attacks generate perturbations that are
bounded based on different Lp ( above) norms (e.g. L0,
L2 or Linf ). These traditional norms, bounds, or thresholds
(referred to as norms in the paper) measure the magnitude
of the perturbation, and are thus primarily suitable for vi-
sual domain applications (lower norms generally mean less
visually-detectable changes) wherein human imperceptibil-
ity is the auxiliary characteristic desired in a perturbation.
In the web space however, the perturbed page has complex
structures and is processed by the browser which parses and
renders the page. Thus, the norms can no longer capture
what is a “desirable perturbation,” and do not work well. In
other words, new metrics are needed to effectively capture
the properties of functionality preservation and stealthiness
of the perturbed web page.
Projected Gradient Descent. Being a single-step attack,
FGSM suffers from low success rates, especially when gra-
dients cannot provide sufficiently accurate guidance (usually
the case for non-white-box attacks). One can improve the
success rate by applying FGSM iteratively; this is known as
the Basic Iterative Method, or Projected Gradient Descent
(Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016). Essentially, PGD
performs FGSM multiple times with a smaller step-size, or
α. Formally, the search procedure can be expressed as:
x0 = xinput
xn+1 = Clip(xn + α ∗ sign(∇xLmodel)) (1)
where, for a given a given input vector A,
Clip(Ai, ) =

Ai − , if Ai < Ai − 
Ai + , if Ai > Ai + 
Ai, otherwise.
(2)
A4 is inspired by the iterative philosophy used in PGD, and
extends its simple clipping mechanism to an extensive feed-
back loop (§3), which seeks to produce actionable perturba-
tions targeting ML-based adblockers.
3 A4: Actionable Ad Adversarial Attack
In this section, we describe how A4 crafts actionable (both
in the feature and application spaces as discussed in § 1)
and stealty adversarial examples in web domain.Recall that
being actionable in the above two spaces refer to the fol-
lowing (i) in the feature space, explicit numeric constraints
defined based on domain knowledge, in order to main-
tain the validity, functionality and stealthiness of the ad re-
quest, must be complied with by its perturbed adversarial
feature vector; and (ii) in the application space, the per-
turbed feature vector must be successfully mappable back
to the original web page. We point out that actionable per-
turbations in the feature-space are not naturally actionable
in the application-space; implicit/unpredictable side-effects
that could result when the feature-space perturbations are
mapped back to application-space (e.g. a feature space per-
turbation of adding nodes to a page changes other features
such as the average connection degree) must be considered
when generating perturbations, by A4.
Threat Model
Before diving into the details of A4’s algorithm, we first de-
fine our threat model. As mentioned in §2, AdGraph is a full-
fledged web browser with custom modifications for blocking
ad/tracker resources. Generally, there are three participants
when a user visits a website using AdGraph: a user, a host-
ing website and an ad publisher; their relationships are de-
picted in Figure 1. As shown, the objective of A4 is to help
User w/ 
AdGraph
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Ad Contents 
Recovered
Ad Contents 
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it
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Figure 1: Different participants in A4’s threat model
the website recover its ad revenue lost due to ads getting
blocked by AdGraph. A4 achieves this by adding perturba-
tions to content generated by the hosting website, so that the
classifier used by AdGraph is fooled into mis-classifying the
ad resource as a non-ad. We assume a grey-box attack setup
as elaborated in §2, because on one hand, even though Ad-
Graph has been open-sourced, it is easy for other ML-based
adblockers to hide their model internals; on the other hand,
the web is a public space and datasets collected from it can
be conveniently crawled and replicated in practice.
Recall that A4 is a gradient-based attack which re-
quires the knowledge of model internals. However, AdGraph
uses Random Forest (RF) as its classifier which is non-
differentiable (i.e. no gradient can be computed), and thus,
we need to find a way to estimate the gradients. Moreover,
although AdGraph itself has been open sourced publicly
(Iqbal et al. 2020), we do not want to limit A4 to com-
plete white-box setups only, which means that even if the
target model is differentiable, its gradients can be inaccessi-
ble (e.g., when only its prediction APIs are exposed). Thus,
we assume a grey-box threat model and make A4 a transfer-
based attack where the attacker has no access to any model
internals (model type, gradients etc.), but is aware of the
training dataset and feature definitions (see §2). Based on
the above, our perturbations should meet the following re-
quirements from the practicality/usability perspective:
• Transparent to ad publishers: As a third-party who pays
the hosting website for displaying its ad contents, an ad
publisher is generally reluctant to change the way they
operate their services.
• Easily deployable at the hosting website: From the per-
spective of the hosting website, the process of injecting
perturbations into the target page should be mostly auto-
matic and convenient. We envision an additional proce-
dure in website deployment via which the web pages will
go through to make changes to the page.
Overview
Optimization problem formulation. Formally, consider
the optimization problem:
minimize
xadv
Dist(xadv − xinput)
subject to Pmodel(xadv) 6= Pmodel(xinput),
xadv ∈ Hfeature−space,
xadv ∈ Happlication−space,
(3)
where, Dist() measures the cost of adding the generated
perturbation,Hfeature−space andHapplication−space denote
the hyperspace that actionable examples can exist in the fea-
ture space and application space, respectively. Note that as
discussed in §2, it is hard for conventional Lp norms to cap-
ture the real cost of adding a perturbation. For this, we also
modify the Linf norm to take the domain uniqueness into
account, as discussed in the next subsection.
Iterative search. Since the optimization problem defined
in Equation 3 does not have an analytic solution (Bruna et
al. 2013), we instead approximate one iteratively through
a search procedure. captured in the pseudo-code in Algo-
rithm 1. The search process not only enforces the feature-
space constraints, but also incorporates corrections to ad-
dress application-space side-effects that occur when map-
ping feature-space perturbations back to the web application
domain. The key guiding principle is to take small steps (in
each iteration) and corrective actions so that we are always
on the right path. (details in the next subsection). To better
illustrate the framework, we show for each iteration, how
the generated original perturbation is moved in hyperspace
to ensure its actionability in Figure 2. The intuition is that er-
rors may accumulate across multiple iterations and can mis-
lead us if we do not correct them at every step (and we take
smaller steps for the same reason). Inspired by the iterative
philosophy that underpins PGD, A4 also divides the overall
optimization problem into multiple iterations.
Transfer-based attack. To craft a successful grey-box at-
tack, we need to use the dataset for training AdGraph to
train a local surrogate model that is differentiable, and then
Algorithm 1: A4: Actionable Ad Adversarial Attack
Input : target model M , ad request xinput, maximum
iterations max iter, maximum perturbation
magnitude 
Output: actionable adversarial example xadv
1 success←− False
2 curr iter ←− 0
3 xcurr ←− xinput
4 while curr iter < max iter and success 6= True do
5 curr iter ←− curr iter + 1
6 pertcurr iter ←− GenerateFeatureS-
pacePerturbation(M,xinput, curr iter, )
7 xcurr ←− xinput + pertcurr iter
8 xcurr ←− EnforceFeatureSpaceCon-
straints(xcurr)
9 pageperturbed ←−
MapBackToWebPage(xcurr − xinput)
10 xcurr ←−
ExtractFeatureValues(pageperturbed)
11 success←− VerifyIfAdversarialOnTar-
getModel(xcurr)
12 end
13 return xcurr
use this model to estimate the gradients and craft adversar-
ial examples accordingly. These type of attacks are consid-
ered “transfer-based” because the successful adversarial ex-
amples crafted locally need to be adversarial on a remote
target model that is different and possibly unknown. We de-
pict A4’s transfer-based attack generation in Figure 3. Prior
research (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016) has
shown that this so-called inter-model transferability exist in
almost all modern ML models (including non-differentiable
ones such as Random Forest).
Perturbable feature selection. Before delving into con-
straints, we need to first manually identify what features to
perturb. These features must be perturbable, indicating that
the attacker must know how to map the perturbations from
the feature space back to concrete changes in the applica-
tion space, i.e., the web page. As mentioned in §2, AdGraph
has two categories of features: structural and content-based
(URL-related). Generally, we follow three principles to pick
features: (i) high impact; (ii) ease of manipulation and (iii)
compliance of contraints (as defined in the next subsection).
Towards satisfying (ii) and (iii), we start from URL features
and pick 6 of them (#2-#7 in Table 1) as they intuitively in-
dicate the ”ad-ness” and are relatively easy to tweak (simple
string manipulations for keyword addition/removal). To fur-
ther guarantee (i), we run ablational experiments by perturb-
ing differnt combinations of features, and show that features
#2-#7 provide quite limited evasion rates. Specifically, these
URL features only offer a success rate of 37.10% (which
as shown later is ≈ 1.6× lower than what is achieved with
A4 with all its features). Thus, as a key novelty in A4, we
add structural feature #1 that is designed to encode the size
of the graph. In order to avoid affecting ad functionality of
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Figure 3: Transfer-based attack
the request (part of principle (iii)), we limit our pertubation
on #1 to being additive only. Under the principles, after sys-
tematically analyzing all the 65 features used in AdGraph,
we identify 7 seed features from both (URL and structural)
categories that the hosting website of the ad request can con-
veniently control and perturb in practice. Table 1 shows their
semantics and data types.
Feature-Space Constraint Enforcement
In this subsection, we describe how A4 imbibes explicit nu-
meric constraints in the feature space. Since the constraints
defined in the feature space can be generally considered for
three main purposes - validity, functionality and stealthiness,
we need to enforce them differently.
Validity constraints. These constraints keep the perturbed
features numerically valid i.e., they guarantee that they fall
within meaningful domains of definitions. For instance, fea-
tures #1 and #7 are counts of nodes and characters, and
cannot be negative or non-integers; binary features #2 to
#6 should always take values of a 0 or a 1. These con-
straints are enforced by projecting any perturbed value
falling outside the meaningful domain of definition back to
the domain. Concretely, we define three projection opera-
tions for binary and integer types of perturbable features
in EnforceFeatureSpaceConstraints() in Algo-
rithm 1:
xproj =

min(0, xpert), if x ∈ Sinteger
0, if abs((xpert − 0) ≤ (xpert − 1))
and x ∈ Sbinary
1, if abs((xpert − 0) > (xpert − 1))
and x ∈ Sbinary
(4)
Through these operations, the perturbed features of our
choice are guaranteed to be valid in the feature space.
Functionality constraints. Besides validity, A4 also needs
to ensure that the generated feature-space perturbations
won’t break any functionality of the original ad request.
Hence, we also enforce functionality constraints onto the
perturbed features. To do so, we follow two principles which
we refer to as non-decreasing and semantic equivalence. For
counter-like features like #1 and #7, we limit their perturbed
values to be greater than or equal to the original values; oth-
erwise, we project the modified value back to its original
value. We refer to this as the “non-decreasing principle.”
This projection reflects our assumption that adding informa-
tion to the web page should not break any existing function-
ality, but removing existing items might harm the semantics
in an unpredictable fashion.
For URL features #2 to #7, we need to ensure that af-
ter perturbations, the original functionalities/semantics of
the request are still preserved. We leverage the fact that for
HTTP(s) requests, different character encoding schemes end
up delivering the same information to the ad server, as long
as the ad server can decode the messages properly. In this
case, for features #2 to #6 that detect predefined keyword-
s/characters from the URL string, we can simply change the
default ASCII encoding to HTML encoding. Since AdGraph
assumes all URL text to be ASCII encoded, our perturba-
tions can bypass its detection over all URL-related features.
For feature #7, we choose to append random characters to
increase its value, and place the appended string as an un-
used query, which avoids disrupting other functional parts
of the URL. Note that these URL manipulations introduce
changes to the request received by the server, ane therefore
might require cooperation from the server-side (e.g. support
of different text encodings). We argue such cooperation is
rather convenient and fits our threat model mentioned pre-
viously — the hosting website and third-party ad publishers
are motivated to slightly change their server configurations
to bypass adblockers and recover revenues. We refer to this
latter process as preserving “semantic-equivalence.”
For clarity, we also define the enforcement operations for
functionality constraints formally as follows:
xproj =
{
max(xinput, xpert), if x ∈ Scount−based
re-encode(xpert), if x ∈ SURL−based (5)
No. # Meaning Data Type
1 Total number of nodes in the graphat the time of classification Integer
2 If predefined ad keywords appearin the URL string Binary
3 If predefined special charactersappear in the URL string Binary
4 If any semicolon appears inthe URL string Binary
5 If the base domain of the currentpage appear in the URL string Binary
6 If predefined ad dimension keywordsappear in the URL string Binary
7 Length of request URL Integer
Table 1: Perturbed features
Stealthiness constraints. Besides validity and functional-
ity, the generated perturbations should also achieve a high
level of stealthiness. Specifically, the perturbations that A4
applies on features will have to be limited by a threshold.
Conventionally, the perturbation size is measured via the use
of Lp norms. However, these norms are unsuitable for Ad-
Graph’s feature set. First, with many binary/categorical fea-
tures, use of Lp norms blindly treats all features as having
the same scale, which is not the case in reality. For example,
changing a binary feature from 0 to 1 means that the sta-
tus it represents has flipped. This is fundamentally different
from an integer feature changing by the same amount; for
the latter, it could indicate that its real value has changed
from a minimum to a maximum value (due to data nor-
malization happened in dataset pre-processing). Thus, if we
set a threshold Linf to 0.3, binary features can never be
flipped (as the flipping threshold is 0.5), whereas integer
values can still change even if a normalization is applied.
To avoid such scale mis-interpretations, we propose a cus-
tomized Linf norm which is defined as follows.
Lcust inf (x) =
{
max(abs(xi)), if xi ∈ Snumeric
xi, if xi 6∈ Snumeric (6)
Besides customizing the norm, we also slightly modify
the operation for clipping a perturbation within the norm.
Specifically, conventional clipping functions (e.g. the one
used by PGD) regard the global range of a particular feature
across the whole dataset as the base of the clipping thresh-
old, for conventional features. For web pages, such clippings
can easily lead to overly large perturbations as the ranges of
many numeric features can vary very drastically from web-
site to website. Therefore, we change the clipping from re-
lying on a global range to a local per-website range, as for-
mally defined in Equation 7
Clip′(xi; g, l) =
{
Clip(xi; g ∗ ri), if g ∗ ri < l ∗ xi
Clip(xi; l ∗ xi), otherwise
(7)
where g is the global threshold, l is the local threshold,
ri is the global range of xi with respect to this particu-
lar feature in the training dataset, given by ximax − ximin,
and Clip(xi, ) is the standard clipping operation defined
in Equation 2. As shown in §4, our customized norm along
with the localized clipping operation, helps limit the effec-
tive size of generated perturbations, and thus improves the
stealthiness significantly compared to the traditional setup
of Linf norms and global clipping.
Application-Space Side-Effect Incorporation
Now that we have generated feature-space adversarial per-
turbations that comply with manually-defined domain con-
straints, we need to map them back to concrete changes in
the web page representations. As discussed previously, ide-
ally these perturbed feature values should all be reflected
accurately in the page. This can be overt if we can re-extract
the feature vector from the perturbed web page and verify
that it matches the expected one.
However, introducing changes (e.g. total number of
nodes) to the web page can bring about unpredictable off-
sets to values of other features that are not included in
the feature-space perturbations. Specifically, there are sev-
eral inter-dependent features considered by AdGraph such
as average degree connectivity. As we add per-
turbations nodes to the page to perturb the feature count-
ing the total number of nodes in the graph, feature aver-
age degree connectivity might also nondetermin-
istically change as the maximum per-node connection de-
gree is raised, which might end up turning an adversarial
perturbation into non-adversarial. More critically, such fea-
ture value offsets/drifts are impossible to be prediceted, and
therefore cannot be pre-computed in closed-loop formulas,
which motivates our design of executing the feedback loop.
Feedback loop. To incorporate such unpredictable side-
effects, we passively observe how changes in one feature
leads to changes in others. Specifically, we first map the con-
trollable feature-space perturbations back to the web pages
by “rendering” the page in a lightweight fashion (we use the
timeline structure in Chromium (Iqbal 2019)) to do so and
then re-extract all the features to capture the side-effects.
We finally verify if the final perturbation (with side-effects)
can still evade detection. If so, we are done; else, we con-
tinue the iterative search procedure to find another candidate
perturbation (we enlarge the current step size by a step size
to generate a new gradient). Effectively, we have created an
automated feedback loop as illustrated in Figure 4.
Mapping-back strategies. For some features, there are
multiple ways to concretize the feature-space perturbations
as changes to web pages (step 4 in Figure 4). For instance,
there are multiple ways to increase the total number of nodes
in a page (feature #1 in Table 1). We can choose to place
these nodes either as the children of a single existing node
(centralized strategy), or as the children of multiple existing
nodes (distributed strategy), as shown in Figure 5. These
different mapping-back strategies introduce different side-
effects to the feature values, and can hence affect the effec-
tiveness of the final adversarial example (as depicted by the
red and green points in Figure 2). One example is that for
the feature average degree connectivity, the cen-
tralized strategy is likely to lower the feature value signifi-
cantly after the map-back as the added nodes cause crowding
and thus, raise the current maximum number of connections
per node in the graph; this is the denominator in the for-
mula that computes average degree connectivity.
In contrast, the distributed strategy tends to have negligible
side-effects with respect to this feature. In order to maximize
the chance of finding a successful adversarial example, we
apply all feasible mapping-back strategies in the feedback
loop, and then verify their results. This helps A4 discover as
many green point cases as possible (Figure 2).
4 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate A4’s effectiveness in terms
of its success rate and algosithm convergence in crafting ad-
versarial examples against AdGraph; then, we analyze the
generated perturbations from several perspectives; finally,
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Stat Value
# successfully crawled
records (distinct requests) 586,218
# successfully crawled
websites (distinct domains) 8,121
# features before one-hot encoding 65
# features after one-hot encoding 332
# categorical features 4
# binary features 36
# numeric features 25
# records to perturb
(distinct requests) 1,430
Table 2: Dataset statistics
we assess A4’s performance overhead 2.
Dataset. Since A4 primarily targets the current version of
AdGraph, we need to first replicate the classification per-
formance reported in (Iqbal et al. 2020) to ensure that our
evaluation is sound. In order to do so, we reached out to the
authors of (Iqbal et al. 2020) and reproduced the classifica-
tion pipeline that they used for AdGraph. Given that the web
crawl conducted and presented in (Iqbal et al. 2020) was in
early 2018, and is therefore outdated, we carried out a new
crawl on September 15th, 2019 to collect the graph repre-
sentation of the landing pages of Alexa’s top 10k websites.
Then, we processed these graphs and extracted 65 features
to form the dataset ready for ML tasks. Table 2 lists some
basic statistics from the crawled dataset.
From the 586,218 request records, we pick 60,000 as the
test set (i.e. the remaining 526,218 records are used as a
training set). These are used to test the accuracy of trained
classifiers and craft adversarial examples. To showcase A4’s
effectiveness over high-impact hosting websites, we select
resource requests collected from Alexa’s top 500 sites to be
included in testing set, from which we randomly pick 1,430
unique requests as the target ad resources to be perturbed.
Model training. To replicate the target classifier in (Iqbal
2We will open source the implementation of A4’s attack
pipeline with its datasets for reproducibility and for future exten-
sionsi, at the time of publication.
# trees 100
Split criterion entropy
Maximum
tree depth unlimited
Precision 0.79
Recall 0.82
Accuracy 0.94
Table 3: Remote RF’s hyper-parameters and accuracy met-
rics
# hidden layers 3
# neurons (1024, 512, 128)
Dropout rate 0.1
Accuracy (agreement rate) 0.91
Table 4: Local NN’s hyper-parameters and agreement rate
et al. 2020), we use the popular open-source machine learn-
ing library scikit-learn to train a Random Forest (RF)
model based on the crawled training dataset. This is then
used as the target model that A4 queries, for each given
perturbed example, to verify the attack result. We show the
model’s hyper-parameters and classification accuracy met-
rics over the partitioned testing set in Table 3. As depicted,
the accuracy metrics with our reproduced RF model are
close enough to the one reported in Table 3, which validates
our replication effort.
We need a local surrogate model that is differentiable
(recall §3), to drive our gradient-based attack. To this end,
we use a 3-layer Neural Network (NN) to be the surrogate
model; we point out that a NN is considered to have the best
model capacity (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016)
for imitating the decision boundaries of other models. The
hyper-parameters and accuracy metrics of this NN are in Ta-
ble 4. Note that in order to best mimic the remote decision
boundary, we use the dataset that trains the target RF classi-
fier and labels given by the target model, instead of ground-
truth labels, to train the local NN. Hence, the accuracy in
Table 4 represents the agreement rate between two models.
Baseline attacks. For comparison, we consider two base-
line attacks we describe below (the descriptions also illus-
Hyper-parameter Value
Iterations
(max iteration in Algorithm 1) 20
Step-size 0.07
Maximum global perturbation
threshold (g in Equation 2) 0.3
Maximum local perturbation
threshold (l in Equation 2) 0.8
Enforcement interval 15
Table 5: Hyper-parameters used for attacks
trate the necessity of our proposed solution).
• Weak baseline: In this attack, we apply the standard PGD
and do not enforce any feature-space constraints, other
than the basic perturbation size limit ( in Equation 1 and
2) and a basic domain of definition (i.e., 0.0 < xi < 1.0).
• Strong baseline: In this attack, we apply A4 for one iter-
ation only (i.e., enforce constraints and execute the feed-
back loop once), instead of performing iterative repeti-
tions. The purpose of this setup is to validate the ben-
efits/advantages of the proposed iterative search frame-
work. Without multi-iteration corrections, we anticipate
difficulty in achieving high success rates, mainly because
single-step approach might lead to application-space off-
sets that disrupt the adversarial nature of the example.
Table 5 shows the hyper-parameters used with our
weak/strong baselines and A4. Note that the parameter en-
forcement interval here refers to the number of steps we
take in the gradient-based search before we enforce the con-
straints and call it one iteration of the feedback loop. We op-
erate at units of intervals instead of steps, because multiple
steps are often required for binary features to be transitioned
across the flipping threshold of 0.5, as explained in §3. Note
that to avoid confusion, we use the term “iteration” to refer
to an enforcement interval. These parameters are empirically
chosen, and we have tuned them to pick the best parameter
set that are shown to yield best performances. We also would
like to point out that out of the different combinations of
parameters, the improvement achieved by A4 over baseline
attacks are generally consistent.
Success rate. We summarize the results achieved by three
attacks in terms of their success rates of finding actionable
adversarial examples out of the 1,430 ad requests sampled
from Alexa’s top 500 websites, in Table 6. We see that A4
achieves the highest success rate in generating mis-classified
examples while guaranteeing their actionability. It is almost
twice as successful (84.3% improvement) as the strong base-
line. This large margin of improvement shows the power of
the iterative search adopted by A4. In comparison, the weak
baseline fails to produce any valid perturbation because if
none of the constraints is enforced, features of data types like
binary or categorical can be changed into meaningless val-
ues (e.g. in a one-hot-encoded vector, more than one feature
becomes 1). This makes it impossible for these perturbed
examples to be rendered in the browser at all.
Attack convergence. In Figure 6, we show a histogram of
the number of iterations a that are needed to reach conver-
gence for all the successful adversarial perturbations gen-
Attack Success Fail
Weak baseline 0 (0%) 1430 (100%)
Strong baseline 465 (32.52%) 965 (67.48%)
A4 857 (59.93%) 573 (40.07%)
Table 6: Breakdown of attack results
Total Centr. Distr. Both
# 857 66 (7.70%) 64 (7.47%) 727 (84.83%)
Table 8: Mapping-back strategy significance analysis
erated by A4, We see that most (>90%) cases converge
within 5 iterations; this shows that the iterative enforcement
of needed constraints and the feedback loop in A4 are ex-
tremely efficient in generating the adversarial examples.
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Perturbation analysis. To better understand the generated
perturbations, we investigate (1) feature significance, which
shows for all successful examples, what features are modi-
fied more/less frequently in the generated perturbations; (2)
feature perturbation stats, which capture the statistics of
successful perturbations with respect to each feature; and (3)
mapping-back strategy significance, which captures “which
mapping-back strategy is more likely to lead to a success-
ful perturbation.” We show the resulting histogram/tables of
these analysis in Figure 7, Table 7 and 8, respectively.
From Figure 7, we observe a high level of significance
(above or close to 50%) associated with all features. This
indicates their significant importance in crafting successful
perturbations. With the most significant feature being #7, the
length of the request URL, it’s shown that increasing the
length of ad requests helps raise their adversarial potential
the most from among all the perturbed features. Note that
this seemingly contradicts the conclusion reached in (Iqbal
et al. 2020), which suggests that longer URLs predict higher
“ad-ness” from the overall data distribution. We argue that
these two observations are actually compatible: for adver-
sarial examples, we are essentially exploiting the discrep-
ancies between target model’s decision boundary and the
real patterns that can accurately distinguish ad and non-ad
requests, bounded by the constraints and perturbation cost
budget. The overall data distribution presented in (Iqbal et al.
2020) does not define the local discrepancy, or perturbation
space with respect to a particular example. The existence of
such adversarial areas in hyperspace exactly showcases the
vulnerability that ML models rely too much on overall sta-
tistical cues to make classification decisions.
Table 7 summarizes the statistics of the perturbed fea-
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Figure 7: Feature significance analysis
Feature
No. #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7
Ave. 865.06(0.9%) -0.08 0.17 0.48 0.40 0.44
21164.71
(19.3%)
Max. 13825(14.5%) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
32937
(30.0%)
Min. 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0
Table 7: Per-feature perturbation statistics
tures. Note that the percentages appended below the statis-
tics of numeric features #1 and #7 are their relative ratios
with respect to the data ranges from the crawled dataset, in-
dicating their relative changes (either increase or decrease)
compared to the original values. Through these ratios, we
can see that by customizing the Łinf norm and enforcing
per-page limits (recall §3), A4 has shrunken the size of the
generated perturbations for numeric features (i.e. #1 and #7).
For example, for feature #1, on average, only 0.9% addi-
tional nodes (with respect to the maximum total number of
nodes in the dataset) are added to the page to flip the classifi-
cation result. Smaller number of perturbation nodes (added)
brings two advantages: (1) better stealthiness of the attack,
since (a) it is harder for adblockers to differentiate the per-
turbation from normal nodes, when there are fewer dummy
nodes and (b) these nodes are properly obfuscated against
simple detection as A4 does in its implementation; and (2)
lower performance overhead for page loads.
Table 8 reports the significance of different mapping-back
strategies that A4 tried in its feedback loop. As can be
seen, in more than 80% of the successful perturbations, both
centralized and distributed mapping-back strategies are at-
tempted (to a similar degree) to craft actionable adversarial
examples. However, in close to 15% of the test cases, only
one strategy succeeds. These cases show the advantage of
applying multiple strategies to cope with the unpredictable
application-space side-effects into the iterative search pro-
cedure used in A4. Essentially, more valid green points (as
depicted in 2) can be discovered with additional strategies.
Performace overhead. Lastly, we report the performance
overheads with A4. This comprises of two components:
(i) offline feature-space pertubration computation and (ii)
online perturbation loading/rendering. For (i), each exam-
ple takes 5.8 min on average (from 1,430 ad requests).
We argue this is reasonable for an offline pre-computation
setup in exchange for recovering ad revenue. For (ii), ren-
dering generated perturbations (adding 39 nodes) for a
typical ad request http://securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/gpt/
pubads impl 2019121002.js on https://www.kompas.com/
incurs an average overhead of 0.23 sec (from 100 loads),
and is hence, minuscule compared to the original page load
time 20.9s.
5 Discussions and Limitations
Generalizability. Although A4 primarily targets an ML-
based adblocker at this point, we would like to argue that
its iterative search procedure and feedback loop are general
enough to be applied to other AML scenarios in the web do-
main, or even other domains. At a high level, any ML task
that (1) fits the feature-/application-space paradigm as the
generated examples should be actionable in both spaces, (2)
is constrained in feature-space due to the validity/function-
ality requirements as discussed in §3, and (3) has associ-
ated side-effect offsets upon mapping from feature-space to
application-space (as shown in Figure 2), can be seen to be
compatible with A4’s methodology.
For example, there are similar characteristics for ML-
based malware classifiers. First, most learning-based mal-
ware detectors still rely on feature extraction, leaving the
space of the discrepancy between these two spaces to be ex-
ploitable by A4. Second, common feature sets used by ML
malware classifiers include a large portion of constrained
feature types, such as categorical (e.g., file type) and binary
(e.g., whether a specific permission is requested (Grosse et
al. 2017; Hu and Tan 2018; Yuan et al. 2014)). These con-
straints can be properly defined and enforced using the op-
erations proposed by A4. Lastly, different features used by
malware detectors can also be inter-dependent. For example,
changing the file type can lead to a different set of allowable
permissions (e.g., system app can request more permissions
than regular apps). This can also be incorporated leveraging
the feedback loop in A4. To summarize, we anticipate it to
be a promising direction to apply A4’s framework to other
applications with adjustments, and leave it as future work.
Improving ML-based adblocking. Given the evaluation
results and multi-dimensional analysis conducted in §4, we
would like to summarize some useful insights to improve
the design and implementation of AdGraph, and other ML-
based adblockers for detecting more ads and trackers accu-
rately and robustly, amid rising attempts from ad publish-
ers to cloak their ads. First, ML-based adblockers should
in general shed more light into their feature set selection.
During our analysis of AdGraph’s features, for example, we
find that there are several global features (e.g. #1 in Table 1)
that encode the overall size of the constructed graph. Since
these features do not describe anything local with respect to
the request node being classified, they are of lower impor-
tance, but leave unnecessary perturbation space for adver-
sarial attacks. Evidentally, the feature significance analysis
presented in §4 and information gain from the Random For-
est used in (Iqbal et al. 2020) both verify the relatively low
predicative/distinguishing power of these global features.
Second, as URLs are the most functional part of a
HTTP(s) request, adblockers should make more efforts in
parsing them in order to prevent string manipulation tricks.
For AdGraph, our analysis shows that it does not handle
HTML’s special character encoding very well, which opens
room for the stealthy perturbation of URL-related features.
More generally, adblockers are advised to implement more
sanitizations to reduce their chances of taking adversarial
perturbation as normal contents as much as possible, or put
less weight on the URL-related features.
Enhancing hosting websites for evasion. For hosting web-
sites that have incentives to fight against the emerging ML-
based adblockers, our investigations suggest three aspects
they can adjust with regards to their pages, to make it eas-
ier to mount adversarial subversions against learning-based
adblockers: (1) maintaining a sufficiently high level of page
complexity to guarantee adequate space and flexibility for
placing adversarial perturbations; if there are too few ele-
ments in the original web page, adversarial perturbations are
naturally more detectable; (2) providing the necessary setups
(e.g. proxy/rotating servers) to accommodate perturbations
on URL-related features. This aligns with the common prac-
tice nowadays adopted by some websites countering rule-
based adblockers (Zhu et al. 2018).
Completeness of A4’s implementation. As noted in §3,
currently A4 is designed to perturb only 7 features from
the possible 64. Although this conservative limit makes our
attack stealthier in practice, we do plan to explore pertur-
bations on more features in the future and further analyze
their effectiveness. Moreover, our current A4 implementa-
tion only has two mapping-back strategies (centralized and
distributed) as discussed in §3. While we argue that even
with these two strategies, we can already showcase the
power of our proposed feedback loop, we will explore ad-
ditional strategies in the future to expand our search space.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of
A4 (Actionable Adversarial Ad Attack), a new adversarial
attack targeting the state-of-the-art learning-based adblocker
AdGraph. Unlike previous work on generating adversarial
samples on unconstrained domains, A4, explicitly accounts
for constraints that arise in the context of the web domain.
We show promising results in this unique domain which can
have substantive implications in online advertising.
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